wiki sagt:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... ttack.htmlFleet submarines I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22, and I-24 each embarked a Type A midget submarine for transport to the waters off Oahu.[65] The five I-boats left Kure Naval District on November 25, 1941.[66] On December 6, they came to within 10 nautical miles (19 km; 12 mi) of the mouth of Pearl Harbor[67] and launched their midget subs at about 01:00[clarification needed] on December 7.[68] At 03:42[69] Hawaiian Time, the minesweeper Condor spotted a midget submarine periscope southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy and alerted the destroyer Ward.[70] The midget may have entered Pearl Harbor. However, Ward sank another midget submarine at 06:37[70][nb 10] in the first American shots in the Pacific Theater. A midget submarine on the north side of Ford Island missed the seaplane tender Curtiss with her first torpedo and missed the attacking destroyer Monaghan with her other one before being sunk by Monaghan at 08:43.[70]
http://www.salon.com/2014/04/06/pearl_h ... as_coming/evidence has emerged showing that President Franklin D.Roosevelt was warned three days before the attack that the Japanese empire was eyeing up Hawaii with a view to "open conflict."
The information, contained in a declassified memorandum from the Office of Naval Intelligence, adds to proof that Washington dismissed red flags signalling that mass bloodshed was looming and war was imminent.
"In anticipation of possible open conflict with this country, Japan is vigorously utilizing every available agency to secure military, naval and commercial information, paying particular attention to the West Coast, the Panama Canal and the Territory of Hawaii," stated the 26-page memo.
Dated December 4, 1941, marked as confidential, and entitled "Japanese intelligence and propaganda in the United States," it flagged up Japan's surveillance of Hawaii under a section headlined "Methods of Operation and Points of Attack."
http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/h ... dr-was-notKimmel took no new action in response to the war warning of November 27
Kimmel argued to the end of his life (and his descendants continue to do so) that no one had warned him of an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor. That is true, but what is more important is that he had decided, himself, that Japan was not going to attack the United States at all. Kimmel essentially confirmed this in his testimony before several investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack, after he had been relieved of duty and reduced in rank. Shortly after the attack, testifying before the Roberts Commission— the first investigative body convened to look into the Pearl Harbor disaster—he said that he did not expect the United States to be imminently involved in war on December 6.
Kimmel disregarded his superiors’ warning that war was imminent and relied instead on his own belief that it was not— a terrible mistake for which he was duly disciplined.
was ich persönlich sehr wichtig finde ist das admiral kimmel sein nachrichtenoffizier fragte wo die japanischen flugzeugträger waren. der antwortete »unbekannt«, darauf sollte kimmel gesagt haben »sie können also plötzlich vor meiner nase stehen«. und trotzdem wurde nicht höchste alarm gegeben.An additional warning came via the so-called "winds" message. A November 18th intercept indicated that, if a break in U.S. relations were forthcoming, Tokyo would issue a special radio warning. This would not be in the Purple code, as it was intended to reach consulates and lesser agencies of Japan not equipped with the code or one of its machines. The message, to be repeated three times during a weather report, was "Higashi no kaze ame," meaning "East wind, rain." "East wind" signified the United States; "rain" signified diplomatic split — in effect, war.
This prospective message was deemed so significant that U.S. radio monitors were constantly watching for it, and the Navy Department typed it up on special reminder cards. On December 4th, "Higashi no kaze ame" was indeed broadcast and picked up by Washington intelligence.
On three different occasions since 1894, Japan had made surprise attacks coinciding with breaks in diplomatic relations. This history was not lost on President Roosevelt. Secretary Stimson, describing FDR's White House conference of November 25th, noted: "The President said the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning and stated that we might be attacked, say next Monday, for example." Nor was it lost on Washington's senior military officers, all of them War College graduates.
On January 27th, our ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, sent a message to Washington stating: "The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all their strength...."
Kilsoo Haan, of the Sino-Korean People's League, received definite word from the Korean underground that the Japanese were planning to assault Hawaii "before Christmas." In November, after getting nowhere with the State Department, Haan convinced Iowa Senator Guy Gillette of his claim's merit. Gillette briefed the president, who laconically thanked him and said it would be looked into.
In Java, in early December, the Dutch Army decoded a dispatch from Tokyo to its Bangkok embassy, forecasting attacks on four sites including Hawaii. The Dutch passed the information to Brigadier General Elliot Thorpe, the U.S. military observer. Thorpe sent Washington a total of four warnings. The last went to General Marshall's intelligence chief. Thorpe was ordered to send no further messages concerning the matter. The Dutch also had their Washington military attaché, Colonel Weijerman, personally warn General Marshall.
On November 29th, Secretary of State Cordell Hull secretly met with freelance newspaper writer Joseph Leib. Leib had formerly held several posts in the Roosevelt administration. Hull knew him and felt he was one newsman he could trust. The secretary of state handed him copies of some of the Tokyo intercepts concerning Pearl Harbor. He said the Japanese were planning to strike the base and that FDR planned to let it happen. Hull made Leib pledge to keep his name out of it, but hoped he could blow the story sky-high in the newspapers.
für mich steht fest daß »man« das PH-disaster hätte können vorbeugen. wer aber hat die meiste schuld?