Die USA zum Thema:
USA: Müssen Assad als "politische Realität" in Syrien akzeptieren
derstandard.at/2000055225918/USA-Muessen-Assad-als-politische-Realitaet-in-Syrien-akzeptieren
Derweil muß Teheran Gratifikationen an Kämpfer in Syrien verteilen. Nicht nur die Opposition wie Al-Qaida, IS, FSA und Co. ziehen ja Kämpfer aus alle Herren Länder an. Auch Teheran hat Truppen, die Assad an der Macht halten geschickt. Darunter gibt es sicher Hardcore-Überzeugungstäter, aber auch viele, die das für Geld machen. Angeblich sollen in Syrien und Irak bis zu 250 000 Personen auf der Gehaltsliste Irans stehen. Irak ist weniger ein Problem. Das Land ist "sicher". Syrien ist ein Wackelkandidat - aus Sicht Irans.
Iran's Assad Regime
Regime Manpower Shortage
The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) no longer exists as a unified or coherent fighting force capable of independently securing the entire country. Six years of defections, desertions, and combat attrition have more than halved its pre-war combat strength to an estimated 100,000 soldiers as of 2014 – primarily ill-equipped and poorly-trained conscripts. Only a fraction of these forces can reliably deploy in offensive operations – perhaps as few as 30,000-40,000 soldiers. These units largely consist of ‘elite’ forces such as the Republican Guard, Special Forces, and Fourth Armored Division that recruit heavily among Syrian Alawites.
Breakdowns in Command-and-Control
The Syrian Civil War also forced the regime to surrender control over pro-regime forces on the ground. The regime mobilized tens of thousands of paramilitary and foreign fighters not beholden to the state in order to mitigate and reverse its operational immobility. The regime directs this coalition through an increasingly decentralized and ad hoc network of command-and-control structures that grants expanded operational authority to junior officers in the field. These structures have been coopted by local strongmen as well as Iran and Russia.
Foreign Dominance
Iran currently provides the high-end manpower capable of securing significant gains for pro-regime forces on the ground. Iran currently provides the high-end manpower capable of securing significant gains for pro-regime forces on the ground. Iran operates a coalition of nearly 30,000 fighters that includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’a militias, and Afghan Shi’a fighters. These forces likely constitute one-sixth to one-eighth of total pro-regime forces – this ratio only increases when compared to the small number of combat-effective regime units.
Iran has deployed at least 7,000 of its own fighters to Syria. These forces include elements of the IRGC-Ground Forces and Iranian ‘Artesh’ that represent the first expeditionary deployment of conventional forces by Iran since the Iran-Iraq War. Iran also leads a coalition of roughly 20,000 foreign fighters in the country, including 6,000 to 8,000 from Lebanese Hezbollah, 4,000 to 5,000 from Iraqi Shi’a militias, and 2,000 to 4,000 Afghan Shi’a fighters. Iran's New Way of War in SyriaThese totals exclude the wide array of local paramilitary groups supported by Iran in Syria. This coalition provides a disproportionate amount of the combat-capable infantry used in major pro-regime operations. For example, Iran and its proxies reportedly provided more than half of the 10,000 fighters assembled for the year-long regime campaign to seize Aleppo City in 2015. These forces also played key roles in the two operations launched to recapture Palmyra over the past year.
Iran has created a self-sufficient method of combined force operations that excludes a major role for the regime’s military. The IRGC has developed a model of cadre-warfare that allows Iran to implant military leadership over a base of irregular fighters that it organizes, funds, and equips in a host country. Iran operates sophisticated infrastructure – including a strategic air bridge from Tehran to Damascus via Baghdad - to train, equip, manage, and redeploy these forces across the region in line with its own strategic priorities. The IRGC – Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah lead key operations and relegate the SAA to providing heavy support including artillery, armor, and airstrikes to foreign infantry forces.
Iran gradually co-opted the regime’s remaining command structure as its combat forces became the most asymmetric advantage in the conflict. Iran reportedly assumed control of key operations rooms and ad hoc headquarters in both Latakia and Dera’a Provinces in 2015.
Iran also played an integral role in the development of pro-regime paramilitary groups ostensibly under regime authority in order to establish the long-term infrastructure of a ‘Syrian Hezbollah.’ Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah played a foundational role in building the NDF based on the Iranian ‘Basij.’ Iran also oversaw enlistment campaigns across the country – in some cases competing directly with the regime for new recruits by providing competitive salaries and military equipment. Iran nurtured its pool of future manpower through religious outreach including funding for theology schools and revolutionary youth groups among Alawites on the Syrian Coast.
Russia, by contrast, strengthened the regime’s military and security services’ formal structures. Russia provides the majority of its military aid, including advanced weaponry and air support, directly to the SAA. This support included the provision of advanced armored vehicles such as T-90 Main Battle Tanks and BTR-82 Armored Personnel Carriers to elite units such as the Syrian ‘Tiger Forces’ and Republican Guard. Russia took great pains to present its military engagement as a bilateral agreement between two legitimate governments against terrorism through high-profile basing deals and public coordination with senior regime officials. These efforts complement the actions of Iran in Syria while simultaneously allowing Russia to develop an independent partner for long-term influence.
Russia also tried to reconsolidate paramilitary groups under state control via new headquarters and command structures. Russia drove the establishment of the Fourth Storming Corps in Latakia Province in October 2015 and the Fifth Storming Corps in Damascus in November 2016. These new corps structures reportedly intend to consolidate paramilitary groups under state control with Russian command-and-control support, funding, and equipment. The Fifth Storming Corps spearheaded the pro-regime offensive that recaptured Palmyra from ISIS in March 2017 with backing from Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah.
Russia has nonetheless eroded the regime’s sovereignty. Russia took control over major operations in Northern Syria in late 2015, including key battlefronts in Latakia and Aleppo Provinces. Russia’s increasing influence in operational planning and strategic decision-making generated noticeable changes in pro-regime campaign design, including the use of frontal aviation and major cauldron battles against the opposition in Aleppo Province. On the diplomatic front, Russia attempted to impose its own constitutional draft upon both the regime and opposition in order to resolve the Syrian Civil War under favorable terms that preserve its long-term basing rights on the Syrian Coast.
Das Auseinanderbrechen der staatlichen Ordnung in Syrien impliziert nicht nur Schwierigkeit für Assad gegenüber der unheimlich zersplitterten Opposition, sondern auch innerhalb seiner Fraktion. Nicht nur gegenüber Hisbollah-Kommandeuren, die sehr dominieren und iranischen Quds, oder Russen, sondern auch viele paramilitärische Einheiten arbeiten auf eigene Rechnung.
Paramilitary groups linked to a wide variety of benefactors, causes, and ideologies fight alongside the regime, generating intense friction with the state. These factions include political militias organized by the Syrian Arab Ba’ath Party and Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Palestinians, private militias run by wealthy businessmen, and tribal organizations. Several branches of the state security apparatus – including the four rival intelligence agencies – also recruit their own paramilitaries. These groups reportedly engage in a wide range of criminal activity that exploits local populations to bolster their meager incomes. Paramilitary groups have even engaged in direct confrontations with state authorities. For example, Assad reportedly ordered the withdrawal of nearly 900 individuals from two prominent paramilitary groups - the ‘Desert Hawks’ and ‘Naval Commandos’ - after their forces allegedly interfered with a presidential convoy in Latakia City in February 2017.
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysi ... sad-regime
Mittlerweile werden schiitische Kämpfer z.B. aus Afghanistan und Pakistan im Iran beerdigt. Auch in der heiligen Stadt Qom.
Oder es werden für die Hinterbliebenen im Iran Wohnraum geschaffen. Staatsbürgerschaften angeboten.
Die Rolle Russlands wird von den Akteuren unterschiedlich betrachtet. Vordergründig mag es einige aufregen, daß sie dort sind. Hintergründig haben sie aber die Hoffnung und einen weiteren Aufgabenbereich, nämlich den Iran zurückzuhalten. Der Iran eröffnet sich die Räume, die Bush und die Neocons geschaffen haben. Es ist sinnbildlich, daß im Raum Syrien/Irak nicht nur ein großes Mosaik an sunnitischen Kräften ist. Sondern auch ein schiitisches (dort meist auch nicht-islamische, wie christliche Einheiten, aber auch Sunniten). Der Irak ist mehrheitlich schiitisch. Aber in Syrien formiert der Iran die Minderheiten. Schiitische Muslime, Christen usw. Dort kämpfen Schiiten aus vielen Ländern. Die sunnitischen Unterstützer sind nicht kohärent. Die Türkei, Saudi-Arabien uvm. sind auch untereinander uneins. Der Iran kann eine konzentriertere Strategie verfolgen. Russland - so die Hoffnung - kann als Partner Irans darauf Einfluß nehmen.
The regional superpower
Thus Iran, as it takes advantage of the civil war in Syria and Islamic State's takeover in Iraq, is looking more and more like the big winner of the Arab Spring in the region stretching from Teheran to Latakia and southward to Beirut. The Shi'ite crescent, which King Abdullah of Jordan warned about more than a decade ago, is amassing unprecedented power in the region even without possessing an atomic bomb and with its nuclear program frozen. If the saying "Islam is the solution" was common in the past, particularly among the Sunnis (in reference to groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas), perhaps the saying from now on should be that Shi'ite Islam is the solution.
Iran is in control of swaths of territory running from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea; it has taken control of Iraq and is expelling Islamic State from there using Shi'ite militias under its command.
The Hebrew-language Walla news site reported recently that Iran has been paving a "trans-Iraq" highway from Iran to Syria. Teheran has enormous influence over what happens in Syria militarily and economically. It operates a cellular franchise throughout Iraq, and - as was mentioned in talks between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in early March - is working to build a port in Latakia, on Syria's Mediterranean coast.
While Iran has not yet begun construction, it has submitted a draft proposal for the port to Assad, who tends toward approving it. The proposal states, in simple terms, that Iran will lease land in the city from Syria and use it to establish the maritime terminal. The port would be under Iranian sovereignty in every way, and the Syrians would have no access to it. In other words, it would be like the naval-base that the Russians established in Tartus. The land would be leased to the Iranians for fifty years.
http://aijac.org.au/news/article/iran-i ... -civil-war
Für Russland natürlich eine prima Sache. Damit wird man wichtig. Das zeigt noch einmal deutlich, was die Stoßrichtungen für den Iran und Moskau sind. Der Iran agiert dort, um Einfluß direkt vor Ort zu bekommen. Um beeinflußen und absichern zu können. Russland, um die Karten, die es dort wegen der Präsenz in die Hand bekommen hat, in Regionen, die ihm wichtiger sind, wie Osteuropa oder Zentralasien zu haben. Inwiefern Russland das kann und will, Teheran einzudämmen, bleibt abzuwarten. Es gibt derart viele gemeinsame, unterschiedliche und überschneidende Interessen, daß die Handlungsoptionen lähmend sind. Zumindest hat sich die Profi-Truppe um Trump durchgerungen. Assad hat keine höchste Priorität. Trump siehts wohl so wie Obama. Was bleibt ihm auch anderes übrig. Bush hat die Weichen gelegt. Der Iran und auch Russland und viele andere in der Region nutzen sie jetzt. Ja, müssen sie sogar nutzen. Ob sie wollen oder nicht. Teheran ist über den IS nicht begeistert. Sie haben erstmals in Farsi direkt dem Iran gedroht.
Bush hat - vordergründig - die Meinung vertreten, daß in der Region die Verhältnisse nicht stimmen, z.B. beim ex-Allierten Saddam Hussein. Das müsste geändert werden. Ok, wurde durch seine Intervention verändert, die Verhältnisse. Und der Prozess ist noch nicht zu Ende. Der Kurdenstaat. Ein Block Iran-Irak-Restsyrien-Libanon mit Teilen Afghanistans und Pakistans. IS. Die arabische Halbinsel bietet auch noch Potential für Veränderungen. Vielleicht hat Bush das nicht initiiert. Aber er hat dem allen eine Stoßrichtung und Schwung gegeben. Viele Kritiker seinerzeit waren keine Pazifisten, die gegen die Interventionen von Bush waren. Ganz und gar nicht. Oder Völkerrechtler, die das rein juristisch betrachten. Nein, es war völlig klar, das das eine Achterbahn wird. Irak und Afghanistan angreifen, böse (ex-Verbündete) bekämpfen, dann blühende demokratische Landschaften und gutes Geld dort verdienen, macht sich gut zur Rechtfertigung, zu mehr nicht.
Es mag so aussehen, als ob es um Assad geht. Oder den IS. Assad ist nicht wichtig. Teheran hat bereits den Grundstein gelegt, ohne ihn dort zu sein. Russland ist er auch nicht so wichtig. Ganz im Gegenteil. Der Kampf wütet zwischen den größeren Parteien und um die Geografie dort.
Wenn das Weisse Haus sagt, daß Assad nun mal die Realität darstellt. Dann meinen sie natürlich nicht eigentlich Assad. Sondern die Machtverhältnisse dort.